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Institutions
C h r y s o s t o m o s  M a n t z a v i n o s
INTRODUCTION
Institutions keep society from falling apart, provid-
ing that there is something that keeps institutions 
from falling apart. (Elster, 1989: 147)
In this phrase of Jon Elster, the relevance of 
institutions for society comes successfully to 
the fore. It also pinpoints the reason institu-
tions have been the object of inquiry for many 
scholars and philosophers from early one 
(Gemtos, 2001). The contemporary theory 
of institutions differs from earlier theories in 
two main ways: First, the very existence of 
institutions is no longer explained by the will 
of gods, the spirit of history, the decisions of 
a wise lawgiver, or by drawing on other sim-
plistic causal patterns. Second, those explan-
atory schemes that have attempted to analyze 
the complex phenomenon of the emergence 
and change of institutions based on the tradi-
tion of methodological holism or functional-
ism seem to be of low credibility and on the 
retreat. There is instead, a great interest in 
most social sciences today in scientifically 
understanding institutional phenomena on 
the basis of methodological individualism,1 
that is, the meta-theoretical principle accord-
ing to which all social phenomena, and thus 
also social institutions, must be explained as 
the outcome of the interplay of individuals 
who are acting under different conditions.2
It is definitely compatible with develop-
ments in the different disciplines of the 
social sciences to claim that in the last 
decade we have been witnessing the develop-
ment of a new research program, “The New 
Institutionalism in the Social Sciences.” In 
Economics, for example, New Institutional 
Economics has become quite popular and 
widely accepted, mainly as it has been 
shaped by the works of Ronald Coase,3 
Douglass C. North,4 and Oliver Williamson.5 
In Sociology there is also a discussion of 
New Institutionalism by Paul DiMaggio,6 
Walter Powell,7 Victor Nee,8 and others.9 In 
Political Science New Institutionalism has 
been shaped by the work of a long series of 
authors such as Jim March,10 Peter Hall,11 Lin 
Ostrom,12 Terry Moe,13 etc. In Anthropology 
it is mainly the work of Jean Ensminger14 
that has had the greatest influence over the 
past few years. As is frequently the case 
when a research program is at its early 
stages, there are many problems that have not 
yet found a satisfactory solution. And as is 
frequently the case when different disciplines 
with different traditions and techniques of 
scientific research are to collaborate towards 
the solution of common problems, there are 
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ambiguities, uncertainties, and difficulties 
in the communication of the results of the 
scientific research. This kind of weakness is 
even weightier in the case at hand, since the 
respective disciplines largely use theoretical 
patterns that lack an axiomatic basis, and the 
terms and concepts are therefore not always 
precisely defined.
In spite of these difficulties – and with 
a full awareness of the disagreement on a 
series of issues – I will start with an over-
view of the main principles and concepts of 
the theory of institutions. After explaining 
some basic concepts and principles of the 
contemporary theory of institutions, I will 
focus on the analysis of the mechanisms of 
the emergence and evolution of institutions. 
I will then proceed by providing the distinc-
tion between formal and informal institu-
tions before discussing the problem of path 
dependence in the last part of the article and 
closing with a short epilogue.
BASIC CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 
OF THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS
Institutions are normative social rules, that is 
the rules of the game in a society, enforced 
either through the coercive power of the state 
or other enforcement agencies that shape 
human interaction (Mantzavinos, 2001).15 
Institutions as normative patterns of behav-
ior serve to (partially) solve the problem 
of cooperation in a society by providing a 
more or less permanent platform of con-
flict resolution. They define the rules of the 
socio-economic game, that is, the strategies 
which individuals are allowed to employ in 
order to pursue their goals and solve their 
problems. The existence of social institutions 
provides the first step towards overcom-
ing the Hobbesian problem of social order, 
the second being the cooperation of indi-
viduals via exchange within the institutional 
framework.
It is quite common in the literature to 
employ the term “institution” in order to 
designate organizations of every kind. In 
order to avoid confusion, it is useful to distin-
guish between institutions and organizations. 
Institutions are the rules of the game; orga-
nizations are corporate actors, that is, groups 
of individuals bound by some rules designed 
to achieve a common objective (Coleman, 
1990). They can be political organizations 
such as political parties, educational orga-
nizations such as universities, or economic 
organizations such as firms. Thus, organiza-
tions, when interacting with other organiza-
tions or individuals, submit to those general 
social rules that we have called institutions, 
that is, they are equally constrained by the 
general rules of the game.
Having now defined institutions and having 
provided the distinction between institutions 
and organizations, let us now proceed to the 
most fundamental problem of every theory of 
institutions: Why do institutions exist? There 
are two classes of reasons that can explain 
the existence of institutions on the basis of 
an individualistic approach. The first class of 
reasons refers to the motivational possibili-
ties of Homo sapiens and the second class to 
the cognitive ones. Starting from the main 
assumption about motivation – namely, that 
every individual strives to increase his util-
ity or, in other words, that every individual 
strives to better his condition by all means 
available to him – it becomes obvious that 
conflicts between individuals are bound to 
arise. Those settings in which the increase of 
one’s utility presupposes the direct or indi-
rect cooperation of other individuals can be 
defined as social problems. Such settings are 
to be termed “social” neither in the sense that 
the individuals involved are conscious of their 
involvement in such settings nor in the sense 
that they explicitly recognize their involve-
ment in such settings. From the perspective of 
the observer, however, such social problems 
are clearly identifiable, and their basic char-
acteristic is that the utility obtained by some 
kind of individual behavior depends in one 
way or another on the behavior of other indi-
viduals. Some stylized social problems have 
been worked out in game theory, such as the 
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well known prisoner’s dilemma, the coordi-
nation game, the game of trust, and so on.
Let us concentrate for a while on the pris-
oner’s dilemma. The structure of this game is 
encountered very often in settings that con-
stitute “social problems,” defined as above. 
Let us think for a while of the setting that 
we are all involved in very frequently in our 
everyday lives, mainly on the sidewalks of 
Athens and other major cities in the world.
 With reference to Table 19.1, each of us 
can increase his utility if he parks his car on 
the sidewalk (instead of incurring the costs 
of a parking lot) as long as others do not do 
so. The socially optimal and thus desirable 
situation is the one in which nobody parks 
on the sidewalk (1 + 1 = 2 units), whereas 
the worst situation is the one in which 
everybody parks on the sidewalk [(−1) + 
(−1) = −2 units]. Given the structure of the 
game and that we are all self interested, we 
end up parking on the sidewalk; that is, we 
end up with the worst possible solution.
Now, we can come back to institutions and 
to our central problem, namely why institu-
tions exist: The first and most important 
reason for their existence has to do precisely 
with the fact that institutions are social rules 
constituting solutions to social problems 
and social conflicts that appear in the above 
mentioned form or some similar form. This 
is their most fundamental raison d’ être: The 
life of man in a society without institutions 
would be, in the words of Hobbes, “solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish and short” (Leviathan, 
ch. XIII: 89). This argument is presented by 
most social and political theorists, old and 
new, with the sole exception of the anarchists. 
But even the most optimistic among them, 
who doubt the necessity of the existence of 
a state, do not deny the necessity of informal 
institutions such as moral rules, social norms, 
and conventions for the existence of social 
order. Human egoism must be moulded by 
some form of social control in order for 
cooperation to emerge, and social institutions 
provide this mould. 
But why do people agree to or accept insti-
tutions, that is, social normative rules, rather 
than deciding each time anew on particular 
norms or conventions to regulate a particu-
lar conflict every time one arises? Why not 
solve social problems ad hoc since, in a way, 
every problem situation – and thus also every 
social problem – is unique? The answer to 
this question lies in the cognitive structure 
of the human mind and provides the second 
class of reasons explaining the existence of 
social institutions. The human mind is far 
from being a perfect tool, able to perform all 
the difficult computations needed for solving 
problems that arise from interaction with 
other minds. Because of a restricted cogni-
tive capacity, every individual mobilizes his 
energies only when a “new problem” arises, 
and follows routines when he classifies the 
problem situation as a familiar one. This 
distinction is rooted in the limited compu-
tational capacity of human beings and is a 
means to free up an individual’s mind from 
unnecessary operations so that he can deal 
more adequately with the problem situations 
arising in his environment.
When we say that the environment of the 
individual is complex, we mean precisely 
this: His limited cognitive capacity makes 
his environment appear rather complicated 
to him and in need of simplification in order 
to be mastered. This refers to both the natural 
and the social environment of the individual, 
the latter being the focus here. Because of the 
perceived complexity of the social environ-
ment, people – consciously or unconsciously 
– adopt rules as solutions to social problems 
rather than deciding each time anew how 
to act and react to the settings where coor-
dination with other individuals is needed. 
Table 19.1 Prisoner’s dilemma
B
Does not park 
on the sidewalk
Parks on the 
sidewalk
A
Does not park on 
the sidewalk
(1, 1) (–2, 2)
Parks on the 
sidewalk
(2, –2) (–1, –1)
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Rules in general, as Hayek (1976/1982: 8) 
put it, “are a device for coping with our con-
stitutional ignorance,” they are the “device 
we have learned to use because our reason 
is insufficient to master the full detail of 
complex reality” (Hayek, 1960: 66). And 
social rules or institutions are our devices to 
deal with recurrent social problems arising 
in situations where self-interested individuals 
interact.16
The German anthropologist Arnold Gehlen 
made the same point when he stressed the 
role of institutions as a means of unburden-
ing individuals from the need to constantly 
make decisions. Compared to animals, 
human behavior, according to Gehlen, is 
much more plastic and adaptable to varying 
environments. But this plasticity and open-
ness regarding behavior, although beneficial 
on its own, causes uncertainty about the 
behavior of other individuals. Institutions 
serve to remove this difficulty.17 By defin-
ing general normative patterns of behavior 
shared by the individuals, they serve indi-
viduals, unburdening them from having to 
decide each time anew. This relief provided 
by institutions is productive, according to 
Gehlen, because it makes it possible for an 
individual to concentrate his energies on 
other creative enterprises. Social rules make 
it possible for us to focus our energy on gen-
erating novel solutions to the new problems 
that emerge, a fact of obvious importance for 
social progress. This liberating function of 
institutions – their Entlastung (unburdening), 
according to Gehlen – is extremely important 
for a cognitively deficient being like man, 
because it provides him with the possibility 
to concentrate his limited cognitive resources 
on other activities and finally with the pos-
sibility to unfold all those activities that 
distinguish him from his fellows as a unique 
personality. As Gehlen splendidly puts it: 
If the institutions provide us with a schema in cer-
tain respects, and if they shape our thoughts and 
feelings along with our behaviors and typify them, 
we can take advantage of these energy reserves in 
order to show within our particular set of circum-
stances the uniqueness which is bountiful, innova-
tive, and fertile. He, who does not want to be a 
personality in his own circumstances but in all cir-
cumstances, can only fail. (Gehlen, 1961: 72; 
Translation by author)
There are thus also cognitive reasons for 
the existence of institutions (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991: 10f); they are a means of 
coping with the ignorance that individuals are 
facing when interacting with each other. The 
institutions, as the rules of the game, stabilize 
expectations and thus reduce the uncertainty 
of the agents.18 They provide a preliminary 
structuring of their environment, a first more 
or less secure approximation of what will 
happen and what will not, and what might 
appear and what might not. But although 
the stabilizing function of institutions is very 
important, one should be careful to avoid the 
functionalist fallacy. It is therefore necessary 
to clearly distinguish between cause and 
effect. That institutions stabilize expecta-
tions is a mere effect of their existence. The 
cause of their existence lies – along with the 
motivational one – rather in the more general 
fact of the limits in the cognitive capacities 
of humans.
MECHANISMS OF EMERGENCE 
AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS
Having presented, in as short an order as 
possible, some basic concepts and principles 
of the theory of institutions, I will now focus 
on the mechanisms at play in the emer-
gence and evolution of social institutions. 
Institutions emerge either deliberately or 
spontaneously, that is, either as a product of 
collective action or as a product of a spon-
taneous process of social interaction. The 
institutions which emerge as a result of col-
lective action, that is, the institutions that are 
designed deliberately, have been the object of 
inquiry of many scholars for centuries. The 
mechanisms of the emergence of spontane-
ous institutions, however, were first studied 
by the Scottish moral philosophers of the 
eighteenthcentury. David Hume, for example, 
envisioned a system of rules of justice which 
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“is of course advantageous to the public; 
tho’ it be not intended for that purpose by 
the inventors” (1740/1978: 529). Ferguson 
(1767/1968: 188) similarly observes that “[n]
ations stumble upon establishments which 
are indeed the result of human action, but not 
the execution of any human design.” And in 
Smith’s famous metaphor, the merchant who 
intends only his own gain is “led by an invis-
ible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention” (1776/1976: 477).
This insight of the Scottish moral phi-
losophers is relevant because, for the first 
time, the emergence of institutions is not 
explained exclusively by intentional action 
aimed at establishing them. Of the modern 
social scientists, the one that has offered the 
most profound analysis of the spontaneous 
emergence of institutions, integrating their 
evolution into a general theory of cultural 
evolution, is certainly Hayek. We shall there-
fore linger a while on his work. In Hayek’s 
theory of cultural evolution, the growth of 
civilization is equated with the growth of 
knowledge, where the word “knowledge” is 
meant to “include all the human adaptations 
to environment in which past experience 
has been incorporated” (Hayek, 1960: 26). 
Hence, “knowledge” does not include “only 
the conscious, explicit knowledge of individ-
uals, the knowledge which enables us to state 
that this or that is so and so. Still less can this 
knowledge be confined to scientific knowl-
edge” (1960: 25). Moreover it includes “our 
habits and skills, our emotional attitudes, our 
tools, and our institutions – all […] adapta-
tions to past experience which have grown up 
by selective elimination of less suitable con-
duct.” (1960: 26). Hayek contends, thus, that 
not only our scientific and practical knowl-
edge is growing and is transmitted through 
time; so are our social rules and institutions.
But what does this mean more specifically? 
Hayek draws our attention to the analogy of 
social rules, used by individuals to solve 
the recurrent problems of social interaction, 
with tools, which in the same way serve to 
provide standard solutions to recurrent prob-
lems. His main argument is that “the various 
institutions and habits, tools and methods of 
doing things, which […] constitute our inher-
ited civilization” (1960: 62) have been sub-
mitted to “the slow test of time” (1967: 111) 
in an evolutionary process of trial-and-error, 
(1976/1982: 135). “Those rules which have 
evolved in the process of growth of society 
embody the experience of many more trials 
and errors than any individual mind could 
acquire” (Hayek, 1967: 88).
According to Hayek, people, mostly in 
a subconscious manner, acquire and follow 
social rules that provide a solution to recur-
rent problems of social interaction in a 
quasi-automatic way. There are two main 
arguments against this view of cultural evo-
lution. The first concerns the notion of group 
selection found in many parts of Hayek’s 
work. Hayek, in explaining the evolution of 
culture, on the one hand, stresses the innova-
tion of individuals experimenting with new 
rules, and, on the other hand, stresses the 
competition between old and new rules and 
the selection of the ones that led to the suc-
cess of those groups which practiced them 
(Hayek, 1979/1982: 204, Note 48). The cri-
terion of selection is, thus, group success; or, 
in other words, the “transmission of rules of 
conduct takes place from individual to indi-
vidual, while what may be called the natural 
selection of rules will operate on the basis 
of greater or less efficiency on the result-
ing order of the group” (Hayek, 1967: 67, 
emphasis in original).
The argument against group selection is 
that it is incompatible with the postulate of 
methodological individualism and accord-
ingly one has to show a relevant feedback 
mechanism relating how, in the end, indi-
viduals within groups are at least indirectly 
benefited by following certain cultural rules. 
It must be shown, in other words, that indi-
viduals in the group in the end adopt those 
rules that lead the group to success. If there is 
a free-riding problem, however, the argument 
is no longer sufficient.19 On the contrary, in 
order for Hayek’s theory to hold, one has 
to assume the altruistic behavior of every 
member of the group. This cannot safely be 
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hypothesized, however, because the existence 
of even one free-rider, who enjoys the group 
advantage without sharing the group costs, 
would suffice to falsify the assumption.
The second argument against Hayek’s 
theory of cultural evolution concerns the 
rules as tools analogy.20 Although all personal 
rules followed by individuals can easily be 
understood as tools to solve personal prob-
lems, social rules cannot be always viewed 
with the aid of the rules-as-tools analogy. 
This analogy 
is less applicable the less the rules in question are 
susceptible to individual experimenting and select-
ing. […] It is less plausible for rules that can only 
be tried out in collective experiments, in particular 
if the collective is a political community as opposed 
to, for instance, a private organization operating in 
a market environment. (Vanberg, 1994: 187f) 
One has to distinguish, thus, between levels 
of experimenting with rules and levels of 
selection of rules, for example, between 
whether it is individual agents or collec-
tive entities, such as local authorities or 
national governments, who invent and imi-
tate new social rules.21 Accordingly only 
those social rules individually tried out and 
individually successfully imitated can safely 
be hypothesized as serving as a storage of 
experience for past generations, as Hayek 
contends.
It thus seems that although Hayek’s theory 
of cultural evolution can be regarded largely 
as a very serious attempt to construct a 
general theory of institutional change, it nev-
ertheless suffers in many parts. A more dif-
ferentiated and systematic analysis of social 
institutions is thus necessary. In closing 
this section of the chapter, I would like to 
summarize by repeating that there are two 
basic mechanisms of the emergence and 
change of social institutions. They can either 
emerge deliberately as the outcome of col-
lective action or as the unintended results 
of intentional human action. In the next sec-
tion I will briefly show which mechanisms 
lead to the emergence of which kind of 
institutions.
FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS
A very productive and very widely used dis-
tinction among types of institutions is based 
on the criterion of the enforcement agency of 
institutions. Institutions are commonly clas-
sified according to this criterion as shown in 
Table 19.2. 
It is impossible to analyze in detail here 
how every type of institution emerges, the 
mechanism according to which it is enforced 
and how it is adopted. A short reference to 
each of these matters must suffice. The most 
important feature of conventions is their self-
policing character. After they have emerged, 
nobody has an incentive to change rules that 
everybody else sticks to. In game theory, 
conventions are usually analyzed with the 
help of what are known as “coordination 
games.” Examples of such rules are traffic 
rules, industrial standards, forms of economic 
contracts, language, etc. The moral rules (as 
empirical phenomena, not as a branch of 
normative ethics discussed in philosophy) 
are largely culture independent because they 
provide solutions to problems that are preva-
lent in every society, as Lawrence Kohlberg 
has shown in his famous empirical research 
(Kohlberg, 1984). The mechanisms for the 
enforcement of moral rules are entirely inter-
nal to the individual, and therefore no exter-
nal enforcement agency for rule compliance 
is needed. Typical examples of moral rules 
are “keep promises,” “respect other people’s 
property,” “tell the truth,” etc. These have a 
universal character. However, their existence 
does not necessarily mean that they are also 
Table 19.2 The classification of institutions
Conventions Self-policing
Informal 
institutions
Moral rules First party
Social norms Third party: Social 
Forces, i.e. individuals 
of the group
Formal 
institutions
Law Third party: State
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followed, and in fact many individuals break 
them. (Thus, the empirical phenomenon to be 
explained is the existence of moral rules in 
a society, which are followed by part of the 
population.) Social norms, on the contrary, 
are not of universal character, and they are 
enforced by an enforcement agency external 
to the agent, usually the other group mem-
bers. The mechanism of enforcement refers 
to the approval or disapproval of specific 
kinds of behavior. Social norms provide 
solutions to problems of less importance than 
moral rules and regulate settings appearing 
mainly at specific times and places.
Although the enforcement agency of each 
different category of informal institution 
is different, as is the specific enforcement 
mechanism, a common element to each type 
of informal institution – and this is very 
important – is that they all emerge as the 
unintended outcome of human action. Their 
mechanism of emergence is thus an evolu-
tionary process of the invisible hand type. 
This process starts as an individual perceives 
his situation as constituting a new problem 
because the environment has changed, and 
then in an act of creative choice, he tries a 
new solution to this problem. Both the prob-
lem and its solution are of a strictly personal 
nature, and the solution is attempted because 
the agent expects it to increase his utility. 
This novel response to a problem situation 
becomes an innovation as soon as other indi-
viduals decide to imitate it. In other words, 
innovation is a social phenomenon because 
it relates new solutions to new problems, and 
those solutions are also viewed as new by 
other individuals. (The case of an individual 
perceiving something as a new problem and 
trying out a solution that is novel to him but 
not to the other members of the social group 
thus does not constitute an innovation.)
The reaction of other individuals and 
their imitation of the solution give rise to a 
cumulative process through which the new 
behavior or pattern of action becomes ever 
more widely adopted by those who expect 
to better their condition by doing so.22 The 
diffusion of this innovative behavior among 
many or all members of a community brings 
about the solution to a problem, which, from 
an external point of view, is social in nature. 
In other words, a social pattern or institution 
arises and the problem-solving individu-
als “do not have the overall pattern that is 
ultimately produced in mind, neither on the 
level of intentions nor even on the level of 
foresight or awareness” (Ullmann-Margalit, 
1978: 271).
Whereas informal institutions emerge 
from the unintended results of human action 
in a process that no individual mind can 
consciously control, law or the sum of the 
social rules that I have called formal institu-
tions, are products of collective decisions. 
The state as an organism23 creates law, either 
by constructing, by the conscious decision 
of its organs new legal rules or by providing 
– by means of suitable adaptation – existing 
informal rules with sanctions (Gemtos, 2001: 
36). Modern public choice theory tries to 
explain exactly how collective decisions lead 
to the emergence of institutions in the social 
arena.24 The presupposition for them is the 
emergence of shared mental models (Denzau 
and North, 1994) with respect to the structure 
of the problems. In the end, the collective 
decisions that lead to the creation of legal 
rules are the result of the political process 
during which individuals and organizations 
succeed to a greater or lesser degree in using 
the power that they have in order to impose 
rules that further their interests. Since what 
we call “political power” is very difficult to 
theoretically identify, contemporary politi-
cal theory frequently views “resources” as 
the decisive factor determining the behavior 
of the players in the political game. Those 
resources can be of three kinds – that is, 
economic, political, and ideological – and 
the degree of their availability to the play-
ers determines the extent of their bargaining 
power and thus how much they can influence 
the political process which in turn generates 
the formal institutions.25
Summarizing what we have said about 
the formal and informal institutions, we 
have to stress that the mechanisms for their 
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emergence are distinct: Whereas the informal 
institutions are generated through an invis-
ible-hand process – in a way endogenously 
from within the society – the formal institu-
tions are the outcome of the political process 
which is imposed exogenously onto society 
from the collective decisions of agents who 
avail of resources, political, economic, and 
ideological. It is thus natural, if what I have 
said so far holds, that there is no necessity 
that informal and formal institutions comple-
ment each other in such a way that a work-
able social order is produced or even more, 
in order for the economic development of a 
society to take place.
THE PROBLEM OF PATH 
DEPENDENCE
The theory of institutions still needs to 
grapple with the problem of the interaction 
between formal and informal institutions. In 
the philosophy of law, the respective discus-
sion focuses on the relationship between 
law and the moral rules and on whether the 
moral rules must be viewed as an integral 
part of the concept of law or not. In New 
Institutionalism the problem is formulated 
in more general terms, mainly around the 
following two questions: (a) How do formal 
and informal rules interact to produce social 
order? (b) What institutional mix of formal 
and informal rules leads to a wealth-creating 
economic game (rather than to an unproduc-
tive game characterized by conflicts between 
groups for the distribution of wealth)?
I cannot refer to all the theoretical attempts 
that have been undertaken in an attempt 
to address these questions, and I will just 
mention that most of them have not been 
successful and we have only just begun to 
answer them. I will try to shed some light on 
one dimension of the problem since it has do 
with the evolutionary change of institutions 
and is of fundamental importance. I thus will 
briefly deal with the evolutionary paths that 
societies follow and with the phenomenon of 
path dependence. Let us approach the issue 
in a systematic way.
New Institutionalism differs from other 
theories of economic development pre-
cisely in systematically stressing the role 
of institutions for the development process 
of societies. The accumulation of physical 
and human capital and the technological 
progress, as they are stressed by neoclassical 
economic theory, are nothing but second-
ary factors of economic development. The 
problem of wealth creation is much more 
complex, and New Institutionalism stresses 
precisely the dominant role of institutions 
play as the rules of the economic game that 
define the incentives and more generally the 
behavior of economic agents, and thus chan-
nel their activities, lead to the accumulation 
of physical and human capital and to techno-
logical progress and, in the end, to economic 
growth and welfare.
It is important that neither the formal insti-
tutions nor the informal institutions alone 
are sufficient for economic development. 
The natural experiments that history has 
performed offer, I think, decisive support for 
this thesis. Germany, China and Korea were 
divided by the accidents of history and as 
a result came to live under different formal 
rules during most of the postwar period. The 
economic performance of West Germany, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan has 
been incomparably greater than the respec-
tive performances of East Germany, North 
Korea, and Mainland China (Olson, 1996: 
19). The informal rules that the populations 
in the divided nations shared did not reverse 
the different trajectories of growth. Societies 
with the same cultural heritage but different 
formal rules will exhibit different patterns of 
economic growth.
Societies that avail of the same formal 
institutional structure but whose popula-
tions have different informal rules are also 
bound to follow different economic paths. In 
other words, formal institutions alone are not 
sufficient to lead to economic growth. The 
experience with the transformation process 
of the ex-communist countries in Eastern 
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Europe seems to corroborate this thesis. The 
dogmatic transplantation of a set of formal 
institutions that have prevailed for decades or 
centuries in the countries of the West to those 
countries of the East did not automatically 
allow a good economic performance. Formal 
rules remain a piece of paper as long as they 
are not followed by the citizens. 
It thus seems that only a sufficient condi-
tion for economic growth is met when both 
formal and informal institutions build an 
appropriate framework for a wealth-creating 
game. With regard to economic growth, the 
relationship between formal and informal 
rules is clearly a complementary one. Only 
when the whole network of institutions is 
mutually complementary in an appropriate 
way is it possible that a framework will be 
created that will lead economic subjects to 
proceed to productive activities and, thus, to 
the augmentation of the wealth of a society. 
Empirical research and the studies of eco-
nomic history have shown that two kinds 
of formal institutions are sine qua non for 
economic development: (1) secure property 
rights and (2) those economic institutions 
that secure open markets. Since I cannot go 
into the details here, I just want to mention 
that this refers only to the content of the 
appropriate formal institutions, but there is 
of course the additional problem of the cred-
ible commitments on the part of the state that 
these institutions will in fact be provided and 
enforced.
The empirical research regarding the type 
of informal institutions that lead to economic 
development is still in its infancy.26 The only 
thing that seems certain from a contempo-
rary perspective is that only when the level 
of trust in a society is high – something that 
mainly informal institutions produce – can a 
wealth-creating game take place. More spe-
cifically, what is necessary is the existence 
of appropriate informal institutions that lead 
the citizens to protest every time that state 
actors do not respect their commitments to 
the rule of law.
I have tried to consistently argue in 
this article that the mechanisms behind the 
emergence of formal and informal rules are 
distinct. This enables me to reach two basic 
conclusions:
1 It seems to be rather rare that the spontane-
ous evolutionary process of the emergence of 
informal institutions and the conscious design 
of a polity coincide in an institutional mix which 
is appropriate for a wealth-creating economic 
game. Two distinct processes of a different 
nature and following a thoroughly different 
direction must coincidentally result in a frame-
work suitable for economic growth to happen. 
The chances that this will happen do not seem 
to be that high, something that even a cursory 
glance at the world map can confirm since it 
reveals that only a few countries are on such a 
developmental path.
2 The complementary relationship between formal 
and informal institutions, plus the presence of 
learning, creates path dependence.
The recognition of the phenomenon of path 
dependence is in fact the recognition on part 
of the modern theory of institutions that 
history plays a decisive role in the further 
process of institutional change, or, to put it 
differently, that tradition shapes the further 
evolution of institutions. If, however, path 
dependence indicated nothing other than 
the rather commonsensical position that the 
choices of the present are dependent on 
the choices of the past, then nobody could 
seriously maintain that we have made seri-
ous progress vis-a-vis the older theories 
of institutions. “Institutional path depend-
ence,” however, refers more specifically to 
the fact that once an institutional mix has 
been established, then there are increasing 
returns27 since agents adapt to their social 
environment, according to the prevailing 
institutional framework, at decreasing indi-
vidual costs (adaptive efficiency). This phe-
nomenon exists because two mechanisms are 
at work: On the one hand, the institutions 
that have been created lead to the emergence 
of organizations whose survival depends on 
the perseverance of these institutions, and 
these organizations therefore invest resources 
in order to block any change which could 
endanger their survival (North, 2005: 51).
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On the other hand, the second and probably 
most important mechanism is of a cognitive 
nature. Setting up institutions requires col-
lective learning on the part of the individuals 
during which individuals perceive, process 
and store in their memories the solutions to 
social problems. Since a considerable period 
of time lapses before this learning process 
is completed, the initial setup costs are very 
high. Once all or most individuals have inter-
nalized the rules of behavior, the institutional 
framework starts solving a variety of social 
problems in a specific way. One can speak 
of the “increasing returns of the institu-
tional framework” in the sense that once the 
problem solutions have been learned by the 
agents, they are unconsciously applied each 
time the same or similar problems appear 
(Mantzavinos, North and Shariq, 2004). The 
combination of those two mechanisms leads 
along paths which a society cannot easily 
abandon, firstly because of the organized 
interests that resist doing so, and second 
because cognitive mechanisms make it easy 
or automatic to follow the rules of the status 
quo. We end up being locked into a path that 
frequently nobody or very few wished for; 
and nobody has the incentive to start the 
enterprise of moving into a new one.
The issue of path dependence can be 
further clarified with the help of a simple 
example. Suppose that we are in front of an 
urn in which there are two balls, one white 
and the other red. If we put our hand into the 
urn without looking and randomly choose 
one ball, then the probability of the ball 
being white or red is 1/2. We proceed now 
according to the following rule: Each time 
that we choose a ball of a certain color out 
of the urn, we put that ball into the urn, as 
well as a new ball of the same color. If, in 
other words, we initially choose a white ball, 
the second time that we put our hand into the 
urn, there will be two white balls and one red 
one. The probability of choosing a white ball 
will now be 2/3, whereas the probability of 
choosing a red one will be 1/3. If we again 
choose a white ball, then the next time, three 
out of four balls in the urn will be white. 
The probability that we will choose a white 
ball the next time will be 3/4 and so on.
The described procedure – Arthur 
et al. (1994: 36) call it the “Standard Polya 
Process” – is a path-dependent procedure, 
though of course it is of a simple nature: 
Each time that we choose a ball from the 
urn, the probability that we choose a ball of 
a specific color depends on the colors of the 
balls that were chosen in the past and the 
structure towards which this process tends to 
settle. In the case at hand, the specific anal-
ogy between white and red balls depends on 
the path that has been followed. The events 
that took place at the beginning of the proc-
ess are especially important since the overall 
number of balls is still small and the propor-
tion of one color decisively changes due to 
the addition of a ball of this color. After time 
lapses, however, the overall number of balls 
increases and the “perturbations” have only 
a very minor effect: The structure that has 
emerged no longer changes.
EPILOGUE
Let us summarize: New Institutionalism in 
the Social Sciences offers theoretical tools 
which facilitate the analysis of the com-
plex phenomena of institutional change and 
provide some answers to the difficult ques-
tions which have been asked for centuries 
by social theorists. We are, however, only at 
the beginning. Many more questions remain 
open than have been satisfactorily answered. 
This is even truer with respect to the issue of 
the evaluation of institutions, which I could 
not touch upon here. Numerous problems 
remain to be addressed: What criteria are 
needed to evaluate institutions, what rational 
evaluative procedures can be used and, even 
more importantly, what are appropriate ways 
to move societies from the inefficient paths 
that they are often locked in? Only a theory 
of institutions that increases our informa-
tion about the structure of social reality can 
provide us with the means of reorienting this 
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reality in a direction that we find desirable. 
Some of the basic elements of such a theory 
and some of the problems involved with it 
have been discussed here.
NOTES
1 The first person to employ the term “method-
ological individualism” in order to describe this meta-
theoretical principle was Joseph Schumpeter in his 
Habilitation thesis “Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt 
der theoretischen Nationalokonomie” (1908), draw-
ing a clear boundary vis-a-vis “political individual-
ism:” “Wir müssen scharf zwischen politischem und 
methodologischem Individualismus unterscheiden. 
Beide haben nicht das geringste miteinander gemein. 
Der erstere geht von allgemeinen Obersätzen aus, 
wie daß Freiheit zur Entwicklung des Menschen und 
zum Gesamtwohle mehr als alles andere beitrage 
und stellt eine Reihe von praktischen Behauptungen 
auf; der letztere tut nichts dergleichen, behauptet 
nichts und hat keine besonderen Voraussetzungen. 
Er bedeutet nur, dass man bei der Beschreibung 
gewisser Vorgänge von dem Handeln der Individuen 
ausgehe.“(1908: 90f).
2 Albert (1998: 18): “[…] den methodologischen 
Indiudualismus, das heißt: die Idee der Erklärung sozi-
aler Tatbestände aus dem Zusammenspiel individuel-
ler Handlungen unter verschiedenen Bedingungen.” 
See also Watkins (1953: 729): “[The principle of 
methodological individualism] states that social pro-
cesses and events should be explained by being 
deduced from (a) principles governing the behavior 
of participating individuals and (b) descriptions of 
their situations.” For a discussion of methodological 
individualism from a philosophical perspective, see 
the classic work of Popper The Poverty of Historicism 
(1957: 142f). (This discussion of Popper is unfortu-
nately tied to a rather confused discussion of the 
so called “zero method.” For a critique of this, see 
Mantzavinos (2005: Chapter 5).) For a discussion 
of methodological individualism from a sociological 
point of view, see Vanberg (1975: mainly ch. 8) and 
Bohnen (1975, 2000). For a discussion of the role of 
methodological individualism in economics, see Arrow 
(1994), Suchanek (1994: 125f), Kirchgässner (1991: 
23f), and mainly Blaug (1992: 42f). Methodological 
individualism in political science was discussed in the 
1990s with respect to the “rational choice contro-
versy.” See Green and Shapiro (1994: 15f), the col-
lection of articles in Friedman (1996), but also Riker 
(1990) and Elster (1986).
3 See Coase (1937, 1960).
4 See North (1981, 1990, 1994, 2005).
5 See Williamson (1985, 1996).
6 See mainly DiMaggio (1998).
7 See mainly the edited volume by Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991).
8 See mainly Nee and Brinton (1998).
9 See for example Hasse and Krücken (2005).
10 See mainly March (1999).
11 See mainly the article by Hall and Taylor 
(1998), which gives an overview of the field, as well 
as the edited volume by Hall and Soskice (2001).
12 See especially Ostrom (1990, 2005).
13 See Moe (2005).
14 See especially the paper by Ensminger (1998) 
containing an overview of the field and her work on 
Orma in Kenya, Ensminger and Knight (1997).
15 This definition follows both North and Parsons. 
According to North’s definition (1990: 3): “Institutions 
are the rules of the game in a society or, more for-
mally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. In consequence, they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social or economic.” According to Parsons 
(1975: 97): “Institutions [……] are complexes of 
normative rules and principles which, either through 
law or other mechanism of social control, serve to 
regulate social action and relationships of course 
with varying degrees of success.”
16 Whereas the traditional sociological analysis 
stressed mainly the normative dimension of institu-
tions, new institutionalism puts a new emphasis on 
the cognitive dimension (Hall and Taylor, 1998: 25; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 15). See also Lindenberg 
(1998: 718): “In NIS [New Instiutional Sociology] the 
full internalization argument (which implied moral 
guidance of behavior) has been replaced by the idea 
of behavior guided by cognitive processes […]. The 
point is that institutionalization is linked to the estab-
lishment of cognitive habits which influence the very 
experience of reality (as a taken-for-granted reality) 
rather than just the response to reality.”
17 See Gehlen (1961: 68): “Institutions like laws, 
marriage, property, etc. appear then to be supportive 
and formative stabilizers of those driving forces, 
which, thought of in isolation, appear to be plastic 
and lacking direction. Each culture ‘stylizes’ certain 
modes of behavior, making them obligatory and 
exemplary for all those who belong to it. For indi-
viduals, then, such institutions mean a release or 
relief from basic decisions and represent an accus-
tomed security of important orientations, so that the 
behaviors themselves can occur free of reflex, consis-
tently, and in mutual reciprocity.” [Translation, by 
author]
18 This is a common argument of all institution-
alists, old and new. See, for example, Commons 
(1924/1968: 138) and Hayek (1973/1982: 102): 
“The task of rules of just conduct can thus only be 
to tell people which expectations they can count 
on and which not.” See also Lachmann (1963: 63): 
“What is particularly required in order to successfully 
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coordinate the transactions of millions of people is 
the existence of institutions. In these institutions, an 
objectification is achieved for us of the million actions 
of our fellow men, whose plans, objectives, and 
motives are impossible for us to know.” [Translation 
by author]. See also Hall and Taylor (1998: 17f).
19 See the detailed discussion of this point in 
Vanberg (1994: 199).
20 See Hayek (1973/1982: 21): “Like all general 
purpose tools, rules serve because they have become 
adapted to the solution of recurring problem situations 
and thereby help to make the members of the society 
in which they prevail more effective in the pursuit of 
their aims. Like a knife or a hammer they have been 
shaped not with a particular purpose in view but 
because in this form rather than in some other form 
they have proved serviceable in a great variety of situ-
ations. They have not been constructed to meet fore-
seen particular needs but have been selected in a 
process of evolution. The knowledge which has given 
them their shape is not knowledge of particular future 
effects but knowledge of the recurrence of certain 
problem situations or tasks, of intermediate results 
regularly to be achieved in the service of a great variety 
of ultimate aims; and much of this knowledge exists 
not as an enumerable list of situations for which one 
has to be prepared, or of the importance of the kind 
of problems to be solved, or of the probability that 
they will arise, but as a propensity to act in certain 
types of situations in a certain manner.”
21 On this issue, see Vanberg (1992: 114f), 
where he stresses: “The ‘rules as tools’ analogy […] 
makes it appear as if the experimenting with and 
selecting among potential alternatives is essentially a 
matter of separate individual choices in both cases, 
for tools as well as for rules. […] It seems obvious, 
however, that it is not generally applicable in the 
realm of rules and institutions. […] To mention only 
two particular obvious examples: It is hardly possible 
for an individual driver to experiment with a ‘left-
driving rule’ in a community where driving on the 
right side of the road is the rule; and it is simply 
unfeasible for an individual citizen to try out a new 
rule for electing a parliament – even if such individu-
als would firmly believe in the superiority of an alter-
native practice.”
22 See Koppl (1992: 308).
23 See the famous definition of the modern state 
of Max Weber (1919/1994: 36): “The state is that 
human Gemeinschaft, which within a certain territory 
(this: the territory, belongs to the distinctive feature) 
successfully lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
physical force for itself.” [Translation by author]
24 For an overview of the field, see Mueller 
(2003).
25 For a profound analysis of the role of political 
power in the emergence of formal institutions, see 
especially Knight (1992) and Moe (2005).
26 For an interesting and thought-provoking 
analysis of the connection between culture, insti-
tutions, and economic development see Greif 
(2006).
27 See North (1990: 95) and for a thorough study 
Ackermann (2001: Chapter 3).
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